Abstract. To understand the coherence with citizens' social preferences of the design of reforms presently implemented by governments, we perform a between-subjects experiment in which we elicit preferences for different types of Welfare State. By focusing attention on alternative models of tax-and-transfer system financing the Welfare State, we test people's preferences for merit versus equality, in a scenario where low-skilled workers are penalized twice. In fact, we observeespecially in Italy -that they earn a low wage and have a high risk of loosing their jobs (i. e.: temporary workers). In order to collect this information, we design an experiment in which we present three different types of Welfare State. In each state, people pay taxes to finance two functions: insurance and redistribution. The taxation schemes vary among the three types. In the first type, we present a proportional system, in the second one an actuarially-fair system and in the third one a progressive system. At a first sight, what it turns out from our experiment is that people choose a specific state according to their expected performance. This could imply that preference either for merit or for equality is not due to ethical principles, but to expectations on one's own position in the society.
AIM OF THE PAPER
In the era of globalized markets, the idea of Welfare institutions providing income and in-kind support to "disadvantaged" individuals, is under scrutiny in recent years, both in economic literature and in the democratic deliberation by majority voting of advanced countries. Many papers have proposed models in which Welfare benefits present the unwelcome consequence of moral hazard behaviour, which jeopardizes market incentives to work and invest. Many governments are pursuing Welfare reforms, the objective of which is twofold. First, to retreat from universal coverage, by switching to "means-test" social protection. Second, to complement public institutions of mutual risk sharing with private provision of Welfare (e.g., private pensions, quasi-market health care, "welfare accounts", etc.) aimed at strengthening personal responsibility in coping with the microeconomic risks (e.g., the probability of bad health and/or low education) and the macroeconomic risks (e.g., the probability of long term unemployment, poverty) through private insurance contracts.
To more deeply understand the coherence with citizens' social preferences of the design of reforms presently implemented by governments, we perform a between-subjects experiment in which we elicit preferences for different types of Welfare State. By focusing attention on alternative models of tax-and-transfer system financing the Welfare State, we test people's preferences for merit versus equality, in a scenario where low-skilled workers are penalized twice. In fact, we observeespecially in Italy -that they earn a low wage and have a high risk of loosing their jobs (i. e.: temporary workers). In order to collect this information, we design an experiment in which we present three different types of Welfare State. In each state, people pay taxes to finance two functions: insurance and redistribution. The taxation schemes vary among the three types. In the first type, we present a proportional system, in the second one an actuarially-fair system and in the third one a progressive system.
THE EXPERIMENT
In each session of our experiment we inform the n participants that: (i) they have to perform an ability task (Raven's Progressive Matrices); (ii) the risk exposure of each participant is linked to the ability exhibited in the performance; (iii) they will be grouped in three categories on the basis of their relative scores; (iv) depending on the category in which each participant was included as an effect of his performance, they are exposed to a "low", "medium", or "high" risk to incur in a "bad event". The scheme works as follows. The best n/3 subjects will belong to the first category -the Starting from a simply economic consideration, we expect that subjects choose the taxation scheme that maximizes their expected income -in the first choice stage -and their real income -in the second one. This means that the rich will choose the actuarially fair system. In fact they have a net income of 238 tokens (plus the expected level of redistribution 5 ) under this scheme, while under proportional (progressive) taxation the net income is 210 (195) tokens. At the same time, the expected choice is symmetrical for the poor. In fact, they earn 85 (70, 42) tokens under the progressive (proportional, actuarially fair) system.
The net income for people that belong to the middle class is always equal to 140. Then, there is no economic reason to choose the preferred scheme. In this case we will be able to test the preferences for merit versus equality.
Obviously, we expect that they people change their choice if the prediction is in contrast with the real result.
PRELIMINARY RESULTS
Result 1. The preferred Welfare State under the veil of ignorance is the actuarially fair state, while, as soon as participants know their rank, the progressive system is slightly preferred.
Result 2. People's preference for a particular state may be explained by their expected/real performance. In fact, under the veil of ignorance, the actuarially fair state is mostly chosen by participants who think that they will end in the first category -the rich. By contrast, the progressive system is chosen by people who think that their performance will be the poorest one. Without the veil of ignorance, this tendency holds. Most of the rich choose the actuarially fair system, while the progressive one is chosen by the poor. Most of people who switch to a different contract when the veil of ignorance drops, actually chose the system that guarantees the highest earning.
Result 3. People who forecast under the veil of ignorance that they will end in the middle-class group, slightly prefer the actuarially fair state.
PRELIMINARY COMMENTS
At a first sight, what it turns out from our experiment is that people choose a specific state according to their expected performance. This could imply that preference either for merit or for equality is not due to ethical principles, but to expectations on one's own position in the society.
